THEORY > FREEDOM
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What is the principle of equality before the law (or universalization)?
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Why is equality before the law a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary?
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Which coercive rules do not violate the principle of equality before the law?
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Should freedom be defended because of itself or because of the consequences of defending it?
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1. What is a coercive rule? (url) AUDIO >
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By the term 'coercive rule,' we refer to a simple logical concept: a rule whose violation legally authorizes the use of physical coercion against the person(s) who violated it.
Coercive rules can be 'good' or 'bad.' However, to establish what makes a coercive rule 'good' or 'bad,' we need a theory, whose brief synthesis is the scope of this section on freedom. For now, we can say that coercive rules, as such (i.e., in the absence of such a theoretical structure), are ethically neutral. The rule that forbids people from raping others and the rule that forbids a slave from freeing himself are both coercive rules if (or when) their violation legally authorizes someone to use physical coercion against those who violated them.
To avoid misunderstandings, it's important to emphasize from the start that, being a logical, abstract, and general concept, coercive rules do not specify the details of what kind or amount of coercion should be used against those who violate them. In fact, the type and extent of coercion depend on the specifics of each particular instance: these are the subjects of punitive rules (or justice in punishment), which is an entirely different topic that will not be discussed here.
Coercive rules can be:
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Arbitrary: when they are made by an authority, for example to achieve a particular end-state or objective. The respect of arbitrary coercive rules we call legality;
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Non-arbitrary: when they are logically deduced, and therefore they exist independently of anyone's (and in particular of any authority's) will, objectives, opinions, interests, vision of the world, or even existence. The respect of non-arbitrary coercive rules we call legitimacy.
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Justice, however one defines it, must logically be based on non-arbitrary coercive rules. If it were based on arbitrary coercive rules, anyone could identify it with their preferred arbitrary coercive rules or end-states ("this is just because I say so").
Additionally, coercive rules can be divided into two different logical categories:
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positive: they prescribe what someone (or a group, or everyone) must do (and authorize recourse to physical coercion if they fail to do so);
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negative: they prescribe what someone (or a group, or everyone) must not do (and authorize the use of physical coercion if they do it).
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2. What is the principle of equality before the law (or of universalization)? (url) AUDIO >​
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The principle of equality before the law (or of universalization) is the logical principle under which the same coercive rules apply to everyone in the same manner, without exception.
This principle is particularly significant because it serves as both the necessary and sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary, and thus objectively just.
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The rationale for it being a necessary condition for non-arbitrariness in coercive rules is straightforward: if certain coercive rules apply to Alice but not to Bob, then by definition, they are arbitrary.
The reason why the principle of equality before the law constitutes a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary is less straightforward and will be explored in the next chapter.
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The principle of equality before the law is logically incompatible with economic equality (or even only less economic inequality) obtained via redistributive policies (i.e. coercion). In other words, redistributive policies by definition violate the principle of equality before the law. This is because, given that all individuals are different in infinite aspects (preferences, priorities, situations, backgrounds, strengths, weaknesses, interests, talents, etc.; in short, individuality) then, in absence of coercion, they will necessarily end up in different economic situations. The only way to have them ending up in less different economic situations is to treat them differently, i.e. to violate the principle of equality before the law.
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Perhaps in order to hide this logical truth, the concept of equality before the law has frequently been confused with legal inequality. Legal inequality involves establishing a criterion (say ethnicity, wealth, vaccination status, etc.), categorizing people on the basis of this criterion, and then applying the same coercive rules to individuals within the same category, while applying different coercive rules to those in different categories.
Slavery, racial laws, progressive taxation, legal discriminations such as 'Green passes' and State privilege itself are all manifestations of legal inequality.
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​3. Why is equality before the law also a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary? (url) AUDIO >
The reason why the principle of equality before the law (or universalization) is also a sufficient condition for the non-arbitrariness of a coercive rule lies in the fact that a coercive rule that is both arbitrary and does not violate the principle of equality before the law is a logical impossibility.
Famous libertarians have argued otherwise, suggesting that the principle of equality before the law (or universalization) is necessary but not sufficient for the non-arbitrariness (and thus justifiability) of a coercive rule. They contended that it's possible to conceive of coercive rules that are arbitrary yet still respect the principle of universalization.
For instance, they cite mutually exclusive coercive rules such as "everyone must drink on Fridays, or else" and "no one must drink, or else". Since these rules apply to "everyone" and "no one", they are believed to respect the principle of equality before the law. However, these rules are arbitrary, evident in their mutual exclusivity. Therefore, these libertarians conclude that the principle of universalization is not a sufficient condition for non-arbitrariness.
However, this argument is logically flawed. Both of these coercive rules imply that there is someone else (e.g., an authority) who can legally do something that others cannot, such as fining or punishing transgressors. Crucially, "fining" or "punishing" here involves the use (or threat) of physical coercion against individuals who have not violated anyone's property. Therefore, contrarily to what these libertarians affirm, these coercive rules do violate the principle of equality before the law (or universalization).
Another example provided is a rule stating that "everyone has the right to aggress against anyone else". According to these libertarians, this also demonstrates that the principle of equality before the law is not sufficient for the non-arbitrariness of a coercive rule.
Yet, this argument too is logically flawed. The rule that "everyone has the right to aggress against anyone else" is not a coercive rule in itself. However,the principle of equality before the law applies only to coercive rules. Coercive rules can be either positive or negative, and the aforementioned rule fits neither category. If it were a positive coercive rule, it would state: "everyone must aggress against others, or else". If it were negative, it would state: "everyone must not aggress against others, or else". "Having a right to do something" cannot constitute a coercive rule. This is shown also by the fact that it doesn't make sense to say: "you have the right to do something, or else". Rather, "having a right to do something" is a consequence of a coercive rule. For example, the coercive rule that prohibits stealing implies that someone (or everyone) "has the right" to travel, assuming no other coercive rules prohibit it.
In conclusion, the claim that the principle of equality before the law is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary is wrong. A coercive rule that is both arbitrary and does not violate the principle of equality before the law is a logical impossibility. The principle of equality before the law (or of universalization) is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary and, consequently, justifiable.
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​4. Which coercive rules do not violate the principle of equality before the law? (url) AUDIO >
By definition, all positive coercive rules violate the principle of equality before the law. At the very least, they logically and necessarily presuppose that there exists someone (e.g., an authority) who can legally perform a very specific action that others are legally prohibited from doing: initially violating the property of transgressors through physical coercion or the threat thereof. It's worth noting that physical coercion can be direct (such as death, torture, imprisonment) or of last resort (as in the case of fines). The key term here is 'initially': by definition, positive coercive rules can be applied to individuals who have never violated anyone's property.
Similarly, negative coercive rules can also violate the principle of equality before the law if they presuppose that there exists someone (e.g., an authority) who can legally perform this same specific action that others are legally prohibited from doing: this very specific action is the initial violation of the property of peaceful transgressors via physical coercion or threats thereof.
However, there exists one negative coercive rule (and logically, there can only be one), which does not violate the principle of equality before the law, thereby making it non-arbitrary. This rule forbids everyone (without exception) from performing precisely the action that, in all other cases, triggers the violation of the principle of equality before the law: this action is the initial violation of the property of others, for example via physical coercion or threats thereof.
For instance, the coercive rule "no one can steal from others, or else" does not presuppose that there is someone (e.g., an authority) who is legally allowed to initially violate the property of peaceful individuals through physical coercion or threats thereof (and thus do things that others are not allowed to do).
Yes: under this rule, if Alice steals money from Bob, she might become the subject of physical coercion (physical violation of her property). However, this violation against her property would not be initial. On the contrary, it would be a response to her initial violation of Bob's property. Therefore, where all other negative coercive rules failed the 'universalization test', this specific negative coercive ruled passed it, and by construction it is the only one that can pass it.
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Last but not least, such violation of her property in response to her initial violation of Bob's does not require a privileged authority. On the contrary, it requires independent judges and police force: both of which not only can but should be provided by the free market process (a state judge by definition is not independent).
The initial violation of others' property (e.g., through coercion, threat thereof, trespassing, violation of free contracts, lack of compensation for damage caused, fraud, and similar acts) can be termed aggression.
We thus conclude that there is only one logically possible coercive rule that does not violate the principle of equality before the law, and which is therefore non-arbitrary (justifiable): the non-aggression principle.
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​​5. What is freedom (or justice)? (url) AUDIO >
There are numerous ideas and definitions concerning freedom. However, these do not all possess the same scientific merit.
Given the methodology of social sciences, the value of any scientific proposition hinges on logical consistency and non-arbitrariness. If a proposition is arbitrary (e.g., "this is just because I say so"), then by definition, it cannot be true and must be dismissed a priori as non-scientific. Indeed, someone could counter with, "no, it's unjust because I say so" (or "because the majority says so") and there would be no logical basis to refute this counterclaim because both claims are arbitrary.
As discussed earlier, in the realm of freedom, the criterion for non-arbitrariness is adherence to the logical principle of equality before the law (or universalization). We logically demonstrated:
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that the principle of equality before the law is both the necessary and sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary;
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that there is only one coercive rule that does not violate the principle of equality before the law: the non-aggression principle.
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Given that freedom requires non-arbitrary coercive rules, then we can define freedom as the rule of the non-aggression principle.
An equally valid way to define freedom is as the 'rule of law'. The term 'rule of law' gains its meaning from its contrast with 'rule of men'. Essentially, 'rule of law' implies non-arbitrary law (law not created by men and not subject to change by men). If the law is created by men or can be altered by them, it is the opposite of the rule of law: it is, by definition, the rule of men.
Today, the term 'rule of law' usually refers to the rule of men (frequently the rule of political majorities). While common, this usage is a deliberate misrepresentation to lend authoritarianism the aura of respectability that rightfully belongs only to freedom.
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6. Should freedom be defended because of itself or because of the consequences of defending it? (url) AUDIO >
Being logically deduced, and therefore a scientific concept, freedom/liberty/justice is consequence-independent: enslaving an innocent man is unjust even when this allows to save one thousand. In other words, freedom does not depend on particular circumstances, or on the consequences of defending it, but on the consistency of the logical deduction process from which it derives.
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​7. Should there be exceptions in the defense of freedom? (url) AUDIO >
As we shall see in the next section on Economics, the notions of "very little freedom" or "great benefit" are inherently subjective. Keeping this in mind, it is entirely possible to conceive of situations where violating "very little freedom" of Alice produces "great benefit" for Bob. Consider a father and daughter lost in a desert, facing survival odds with their only recourse being to break into the only house they can reach (an empty house whose owner is unreachable) and to take a bottle of water. In such an extreme and unlikely situation, one can safely assume that most would break into the house, indeed, should do so. However, does this scenario challenge the theory of freedom? Does it suggest that there should be exceptions in the defense of private property?
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The answer to both questions is no.
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The theory of freedom, being logically deduced, is not affected in the least. If that man breaks into the house, he initially violates the owner's property, regardless of the circumstances that made him do it and of the consequences if he had not done it. These are attenuating circumstances but do not change the logical fact that there was an initial violation of private property, and therefore aggression. This doesn't mean that he should not do it. However, it means that, if he chooses to do it, he does it under his own responsibility: should the owner wish to seek punishment, he should accept it as his right.
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In addition, this example does not suggest at all that there should be exceptions in the defense of private property. If someone made a law that allowed that man (or every one else in similar circumstances; or an authority on their behalf) to legally violate other people's property, then freedom would be compromised. However, this is not the case. Freedom is not a situation in which there are no initial violations of private property, but one in which initial violations of private property cannot be legal. While extreme circumstances can produce exceptions in individual behavior, they cannot produce exceptions in the validity of the theory of freedom and in its defense. In this case, defending freedom implies defending the right of the owner to prosecute the offender if he wishes to do so. However, it equally implies defending the right of the owner to pardon the transgressor, for example in light of the extreme circumstances and in light of his behavior. For example, if the man takes as little water as possible, leaves a note with his contacts explaining the situation, asking for pardon, offering to pay for all damage and inconvenience caused, the owner might choose not to prosecute him. On the contrary, he might even be happy that the man did it, and wish him well. In any case, an aggression was made: the extraordinary circumstances can influence the punishment (if any) but they cannot alter the fact that there was an illegitimate violation of private property.
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​8. Does the construction of roads justify slavery? (url) AUDIO >
We have seen that the principle of equality before the law is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for a coercive rule to be non-arbitrary, and therefore objectively, scientifically just.
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Now, State privilege constitutes a fundamental, structural, systemic violation of the principle of equality before the law. If Alice committed exactly the same action the State commits when it taxes, she would be charged with extortion.
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The respect of the principle of equality before the law rules out, by definition, State privilege, and therefore the State itself.
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When confronted with this objective, logical fact, most people argue something similar to this: "Without the State, who would build roads?".
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In this simple phrase, there are at least two major problems, any one of which being enough to invalidate it.
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The first problem is of logical consistency. Suppose that for some reasons (e.g. absence of people willing to work in road construction) the only way roads could be built was by recurring to slave labor. In this case, would the construction of roads justify slavery? No, of course. The reason is that particular economic needs cannot justify legal violation of the principle of equality before the law. In other words, this principle must be respected whatever the consequences. However, assuming for a moment that without State privilege there could be no roads, the question "Without the State, who would build roads?" implies that particular economic needs can justify legal violation of the principle of equality before the law (State privilege).
The second problem is that that question is about economics, not ethics. However, the thesis objected is ethical, not economic. In order to be meaningful, an objection to the thesis that State privilege violates the principle of equality before the law (which in most cases is enshrined in its constitution by the way) has to be made in the field of ethics, not in the field of economics. Again, the argument against slavery is purely ethical: the economic consequences of the ban on slavery are irrelevant.
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In the next section about economics we'll mention why the assumption that without State privilege there would be no roads (or other goods/services which today are coercively provided/maintained by the State) is logically absurd.
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​9. Can freedom be achieved? (url) AUDIO >
A perfectly free society has never existed and never will. However, four things objectively do exist:
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a non-arbitrary (scientific) idea of freedom (see above);
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a gap (or rather a space) of arbitrary coercion between the coercive rules applied in a territory and the non-arbitrary coercive rules of freedom. The greater this space, the less free the society. For simplicity, I will refer to this as the "space of arbitrary coercion".
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the dynamics of this space. This space is never static: it either expands or contracts. When it expands, society moves away from freedom (non-arbitrarily defined). When it contracts, society becomes freer.
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the consequences: These are not only economic but also psychological, for example. The freer a society, the more prosperous it is, and vice versa. Paraphrasing Ayn Rand, one can ignore the scientific laws of freedom and economics, but one cannot ignore the consequences of ignoring these laws.
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Provided there is no hesitation or ambiguity regarding these scientific truths, long-term progress towards freedom (and thus prosperity) can occur in two non-mutually exclusive ways:
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Linear Process: The space of arbitrary coercion is systematically reduced towards non-arbitrary coercive rules. This can happen in two ways:
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centralized reform: This occurs when formal legislation, inspired by a scientific approach to freedom and economics, is produced by a political authority;
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decentralized reform with a central agent (Trojan horse). This involves:
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informal legislation: produced by the free market process and limited by non-arbitrary coercive rules;
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transformation into formal legislation: via a central agent (e.g. political majority) whose decision-making power is formally intact but informally neutralized by a structure of incentives.
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'Bubbles process': The space effectively occupied by arbitrary coercion is reduced through growing 'pockets' of freedom that spontaneously form in society. This can become easier or possible due to new technology. For example, PGP asymmetric cryptography greatly increased the space in which individuals can communicate their disagreement with the authority without fear of legal aggression by it. Same for Bitcoin. This is why the focus of the practical section of this website is on the use of these technologies.
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Some include, among the factors that can produce an advancement of freedom, cultural change. However, even assuming that such paradigmatic change happened on a sufficiently large scale, in order to produce results it would need to manifest itself through these two processes: either linear or "bubbles".
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In conclusion, perfect freedom probably cannot be achieved. However, by maintaining a steadfast scientific direction and eliminating arbitrary coercion as swiftly as possible, progress towards greater freedom is achievable today. Thanks to technologies like Bitcoin, this process is already underway.
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